PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS

SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Balcom v. O'Brien, 83 Northwestern, 562 (South Dakota),
discloses some pretty serious bungling on the part of the attorThe suit was on a note,
Indorsement ney for the defendant.
by Attorney and the indorsement was in the name of the payee,
"per George N. Farwell, his Attorney in Fact."
In Fact
This was offered in evidence by the plaintiff and was admitted,
defendant's attorney making no objection. Later he asked
that a verdict for defendant be directed, because the plaintiff
had not proved George N. Farwell, the attorney in fact of the
payee. But the court held the objection made too late; that
when the note was offered was the time when the plaintiff
should have been called on to prove Farwell's attorneyship,
and allowing the note to be admitted without objection precludes him from raising this question later.
The principle that a writing on the back of a note, "We
hereby guarantee the payment of the within note," does
auaranty

not

constitute an indorsement, but under the

Massachusetts rule a non-negotiable chose in
action, is reiterated in the case of Edgerly v. LanEnforce
son, 57 Northeastern, lO2O. The court also in the same case
applies the well-established rule that a transfer of a note after
maturity, though without consideration, for the purpose of
having the transferee bring an action thereon, entitles him to
maintain such action in the right of the transferor.
Action to

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The efforts on the part of various States to control the rates
charged by railroads have been fruitful of litigation, and cases
In
StateRu- seem always to leave some undecided point.
lattonof
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McCtord, 103 Federal,
216, a statute of Kentucky passed so late as
Rates
March

1o,

i9OO, after many of the important decisions in ref-

erence to those State enactments, is held a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutional on several
grounds: first, because it allowed a commission to fix the
661
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

rates of one particular railroad without the necessity of such
rate being general, thus denying to such company the equal
protection of the laws; and second, because it made the basis
of the regulation of rate the fact that such railroad had
charged extortionate rates, and left the decision of this latter
question to the commission, a non-judicial body, free to determine in its own discretion what should constitute extortion.
This commission was authorized to act merely upon notice
sent to an employe of the company, and if it found that the
rates hitherto charged were extortionate there was no appeal
from its finding. The law in such case allowed it to fix rates
at what it regarded as just and reasonable. The Circuit Court
of the United States (D. Kentucky) held that this combination
of provisions clearly provided for a taking of property without
due process of law and could not be upheld.
The act was further held invalid because the charter of the
railroad company in this case fixed the maximum rates it
might charge, and the court held that this act, without attempting to repeal such charter, empowered the railroad commission
to subject the company to criminal prosecution and heavy
punishment for charging the rates therein authorized.
The well-known original package rule finds a late application in May & Co. v. City of New Orleans, 20 Supreme Court
Reporter, 976. The case turns on what is an
T..tion,
original package, and in this case the tax imposed
original
Package Rule by the city of New Orleans is held not to be violative of the Federal Constitution, because while the goods
were retained in certain packages in which they were received,
yet the "boxes, cases or bales in which the goods were
shipped were the original packages." When these were opened
the package was broken and its contents became mingled with
the general mass of property in the state, notwithstanding
that inside these "boxes, cases or bales" the goods were
packed in smaller packages, which latter packages remained
unopened when the tax was imposed.
The constitutional provision securing to the accused the
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him has freDepositions, quently been argued to affect the right of the
Right to b. United States to use depositions of absent witConfronted nesses. In Motes v. United States, 20 Supreme
with
Court Reporter, 993, this provision was held to
Witneses
prevent, on the final trial of the defendant, the use
of the deposition or statement of an absent witness taken at an
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examining trial, where it did not appear that the witness was
absent by the suggestion, connivance or procurement of the
accused, but where it did appear that his absence was due to
the negligence of the prosecution. There had been an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine, but this was regarded
as insufficient, when it clearly appeared that failure to produce
the witness himself resulted from unexplained negligence on
the part of the officers of the government.
Following Village of Norvood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, the
U. S. Circuit Court (E. D. Michigan) holds in Parkerv. City
of Detroit, 103 Fed. 357, that the provisions in
Street
Improvement
Assessment

a city charter requiring the common council to

assess the entire cost of paving upon the property abutting on the street pro rata according to the foot
front of such property, without any reference to the question of benefits, the only notice required to lot owner being
by publication in the city newspaper, and no tribunal having
any authority to reduce the assessments or review the
amount thereof-that all these provisions together constitute
a mode of taking property which is not that due process of
law required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. No provision being made-for an inquiry into the benefit
accruing to the various properties from the"assessment, it was
prima facie manifest that such a method would not secure a
just result.
The provision in the Fifth Amendment of the National Constitution, that a man shall not be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, decides the
Privilege
of
case of In re Feldstein, 103 Federal, 269. The
Witness
answers in that case would have disclosed that
certain checks were given for gambling debts, the receipt of
which under laws of New York, where the U. S. District
Court was trying the case, is a criminal offence. Itwas sought
to avoid this provision of the Constitution by claiming that
Section 7a (9), in enacting that as respects the bankrupt-and
this i as a bankruptcy case-" no testimony given by him 'hall
be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding," protected also the witness in bankruptcy proceedings and
deprived him of the constitutional privilege. But the court
held that, even if the action in question should be so construed, this would not follow, because to enable the court to
compel the witness to testify the law must be such that it for-

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).
ever bars him from prosecution for the offence which his testimony discloses; otherwise, the constitutional psivilege
operates.
All will admit that a court may not arbitrarily insert an
intent into a statute, where no intent is expressed upon the
face, but where this rule is applied-as it is by the
L"
wn Sale
5t- dissenting justices of the Supreme Court of CaliW¢ng
of 01f of
fornia in Ezparte Lorenzen, 61 Pac. 68-to nullify
the plain intent of the statute and, in addition, to
Tranler
render the latter unconstitutional, a halt should be
Tickets
called. A San Francisco ordinance rendered it a misdemeanor
for any person but an authorized street car conductor to
"deliver, sell or give" to another any transfer of a street railway company. The majority of the court held that this was
a valid exercise of the police power, as it certainly was; but
the minority declared that it was unreasonable and in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the ordinance did not
declare in express terms that it was aimea only at fraudulent
or illegal selling or delivery, and therefore, "if the conductor
should give to a father traveling with his family three or four
transfers, and 'he in turn should hand them over to his wife
and children, he would at once become amenable to the
ordinance !"
State v. Santee, 82 N. W. 445, gives a blow to an important
monopoly in the State of Iowa. A statute was passed prohibiting the sale of petroleum for illuminating purrivile
to one of a

poses emitting a combustible vapor at less than a

certain temperature, "except the lighter products,
CA"a
of petroleum when used in the Welsbach hydrocarbon incandescent lamp." It being shown that there were other lamps
constructed substantially upon the same principle as the Welsbach lamp, the Supreme Court of Iowa properly declared the
statute void, as an attempt to deprive the other lamp manufacturers of equal protection of the laws, as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Municipal ordinances regulating the retailing of liquors and
the opening and closing of saloons have generally been susMunicipal tained. However, such ordinances may go too
Ornannce,

far.

In Mayor, etc. v. McCann, 58 S. W. 114,

the ordinance prohibited any owner of a saloon
from entering his saloon on Sunday for any purpose, without
special permission from the mayor of the town. The Supreme
Court of Tennessee held the ordinance arbitrarily oppressive
and void under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Renso-ablen-
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COURTS.

Gableman v. Peoria,etc., Rwy. Co., ioi Fed. x, is an important case, passing, as it does, upon a question which must
Jurisdiction In ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court of
Suits Against the United States. The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit were called upon to deFederal
cide whether or not an action against a receiver
Receivers
of a railroad for negligence in the operation of the road is removable into the Federal court solely on the ground that the
receiver has been appointed by a Federal court. Judge
Grosscup, in a well-reasoned opinion, decides that the action
is not so removable, since it does not bring into question any
matter connected with a law of the United States, or the
decree appointing the receiver. The remarks of Fuller, C. J.,
in Pope v. Rwy. Co. 173 U. S. 573, are taken to be an "ex
cathedraannouncement" of the doctrine, but it is not always
safe to put too much reliance upon such dicta.

CRIMINAL LAW.

The case of Motes v. United States, above referred to, settles
the rule that though under ordinary circumstances appeals
Jurisdiction from judgments of the U. S. District Court in
of U. s.
criminal cases, where the offence is not capital,
Supreme Cotrt are only to the Circuit Court. of Appeals, yet
where the case involves a consideration of a right claimed
under the Federal Constitution an appeal may be taken
directly to the Supreme Court.

DAMAGES.

The difficulty of attempting to try two issues in one, which
has had so much influence in the development of the doctrine
be the determining element
of set-off, appears to
at the basis of the New Jersey decision of Wyckoff
No Rsuon
23.
In that case A., the
tiff
Guilty of owner of woodland, sold timber to B. B. cut, but
Actionable
Wrong.
failed to remove in agreed-upon time. A. converted part of the lumber. B. sues A. for this

beause Plain. v. Bodine, 47 Atlantic,

conversion and it is held that the measure of damages is the
value of timber taken at the time A. converted it; and that
A. may not claim in reduction of this that'he has been injured
by B.'s having left the timber on his property without legal
right. This gives him a cause of action against B., but he
must enforce it in another suit.
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DEATH AS A CAUSE OF ACTION.

Whether or not a settlement between an injured person and
the party by whom he is injured deprives the persons, who
Rightsof would have a cause of action by statute in the
statutory
Benefiaries
after Settle-

event of his death, of their remedy is the question presented in Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-

ment by In- graph Co. v. Cassin, 36 Southeastern, 881. Under
lured Party the English decisions, construing Lord Campbell's

Act, such settlement is held a bar to further proceedings,
whether by the personal representatives of the decedent or
the statutory beneficiaries. This is a result largely of the
language of the act which gives this new remedy in such
cases, as the deceased had a cause of action at the time of his
death. If he has settled, of course he had no cause of action
at the time of his death, and in such case the act does not
confer any, but leaves matters as at common law.
The language of the Georgia Code is not conclusive as it
is in Lord Campbell's Act, but gives a right of action where
death is caused by negligence to certain relatives of the
deceased; yet the Supreme Court follows the doctrine of the
English courts and holds the settlement by the injured party
before his death a bar to any recovery under the statute thereafter. The court enters into a careful review of the cases on
this subject in the various courts of the country, and reaches
its conclusions on general principles extra the language of the
statute. The decision of the court is opposed by a vigorous
dissent on the part of Justice Colb, which is concurred in by
another justice of the court.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.

The Supreme Court of California holds in Wright v. Perry,
62 Pacific, 176, that an indebtedness incurred by a guardian
of the estate of a minor is not a good consideraNote of
luardiation for a note by the successor of such guardian.
C sideration An effort was made to hold the ward on the
ground of a ratification, in that she had knowingly received
the benefits derived from the expenditure of such money, but
the court held that as none of these benefits accrued after her
coming of age she could not be held even though she had
not expressly disavowed liability on attaining her majority.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Incidentally illustrating the modem tendency of the law to
depart from the original theory of the legal unity of husband
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HUSBAND AND WIFE (Continued).
Domicile of and wife; the case of Hicks v. Fox, 83 NorthChildinCus- western, 538 (Minnesota), refuses to follow the
tody of Di- strict common law rule that until majority the
vorced Wife. domicile of a child is always that of its father, but

holds that where the wife has been divorced and the custody
of the child awarded to her unrestrictedly, the domicile of
the child is that of the mother. The common law theory,
the court says, merged the legal entity of the wife in that of
her paramount lord, and until recent enabling statutes she
had no separate legal existence; from which "it followed as a
logical necessity that the residence of the wife and mother,
even in cases of separation, did not control and fix the domicile of the marriage offspring."
Yet notwithstanding the many innovations of the past century, common law rules are continually reappearing in the
decisions, for in the Supreme Court of MassachuContract
between Hus- setts the old rule that a wife could not contract
band and
with her husband was recently re-enforced under
Wife
the following circumstances: The plaintiff had
loaned money to a married woman and received in return her
notes payable to her husband and indorsed by him and others
to the plaintiff. It was held that the note was void ab initio;
no recovery on the notes could be had against the administrator of the estate of the maker, she being ddceased. It was
argued that the administrator was estopped to deny the
validity of the note, but there being no allegation of fraudulent conduct inducing plaintiff to take the notes, the court
held there was no foundation whatever for an estoppel. However, court holds that an action on the common counts in
assumpsit for money lent or for money had and received could
be maintained: National Granite Bank v. Tyndale, 57 Northeastern, 1022.
The New Jersey Court of Chancery in Russell v. Russel,
47 Atlantic, 37, makes a pretty thorough review of the law
relating to the strict good faith required in the
ntenupta
formation of such a contract. The parties, as the
Contract

books put it with almost unconscious humor, are
not treating with each other "at arms' length," and the conduct of the husband to be towards his fiancee in inducing her
to enter into such an agreement is most cirefully scrutinized.
An agreement which deprives her of rights which she would
have had under the law in the absence of such agreement
throws on the husband the burden of proving that it was
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entered into by her with full knowledge of what she was
resigning. But no presumption will be raised that the agreement does deprive her of such rights. "It is only when it
has been established by sufficient evidence that there is reason
to believe that the intended wife has been misled ... that
the burden of proof shifts," and obliges the husband to establish the good faith of the transaction.

INSURANCB.

Although a member of a mutual insurance company is
chargeable with notice of the provisions of the company's
charter, yet this notice is "of a very vague and
rtual
Isuanc
shadowy character," and courts are slow to enforce
company,
it to the disadvantage of the member. Thus in
VoIatlon of Watts v. Life Association, 82 N. W. 441, the comCharter
pany issued a policy in return for assessments at a
lower rate than that allowed by the charter. In an action on
the policy, the Supreme Court of Iowa applied the Pennsylvania rule as to ultra sires contracts, and held that the
company, having received the assessments, could not set up
in defence its own violation of its charter. It may be said
that, while the decision may appear very fair to Mr. Watts,
yet if the courts intend to lay down the rule that each member of a mutual company may persuade the officers to issue
him a policy without requiring him to pay sufficient assessments in return for it, a number of receivers will be needed for
mutual insurance companies.
In NorthernAssur.Co.v. BuildingAss'n., io IFed. 77, an action
was brought upon a policy of insurancs containing the usual
clauses that notice of other insurance must be enWaiver of
cassta
oieo te
nuac
utb
n
dorsed upon the policy, and that no agent should
Provialon
have power to waive any provision, etc. The Circuit
I. Regard
to Other
Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) decided that
I""rune the mere delivery of the policy by an agent who
had knowledge of the other insurance and acceptance of the
premium by him amounted to a waiver of the breach of the
condition, since the clause as to the non-ability of agents to
waive conditions was nugatory, as far as it concerned acts
done previous to the inception of the contract. This is the
view generally taken by the Federal courts, but the dissenting
opinion of Sanborn, J., is supported by the case of Carpenter
v. Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495, and by a number of state decisions.
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MASTER AND TENANT.

The development of the fellow-servant rule during this
century has helped to bring out with greater clearness the
duties of a master to a servant, inasmuch as the
Injury to
Employe, Lia- question whether A. is the fellow-servant of B. is
bility for Acts frequently solved by answering the question
ot Foreman. whether or not to A. have been delegated some of
those duties which the master owes to his servants. In such
case he cannot under the fellow-servant rule escape liability
for their negligent performance by A. This principle is
enforced by the United States Circuit Court (D. Montana) in
.llis v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 103 Federal, 416, where it is
applied to the general duty of the master to provide his servant with a safe place of work. He still remains responsible
for failing to do so, though such failure arises through the
negligence of another employe, the foreman, to whom he has
sought to delegate this responsibility.
The general doctrine with respect to this duty of the master
to furnish a safe place of employment, together with the
Duty to Fur- question of how far the servant's knowledge of the
nulbSalePlace insecurity and assumption of the risk affects the

to Work.
matter, is pretty thoroughly discussed in Mason
v. Yockey, 103 Federal, 265, the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals coming. to the conclusion that the employe had
a right to presume the place of work was safe, and that it was
for jury to say how far his knowledge of the facts that tended
to render the place insecure and his continuance of work in
spite of such knowledge showed contributory negligence.
NEGLIGENCE.

The tendency of the courts to lay down rules in railroad
negligence cases as to what constitutes negligence appears in
Accident at Hoopesv. West Jersey & Seashore R. Co., 47 Atlantic, 27 (New Jersey). In that case plaintiff was
Crossing
driving in a sleigh at night along publi-c highway,
and on coming near railroad track, looked up and down to see
whether a train was coming. He claimed that, though he saw
various lights along the track, he did not notice that any was
moving. In fact, one was the headlight of an engine, which
struck plaintiff as he drove upon the track. It was held that
there being no other danger to distract the plaintiff's attention, he should, in the exercise of ordinary care, have looked
with sufficient care to have detected that one of the lights
was moving, and then should have waited until reasonably
assured that it was safe to cross, and that his not doing so was
negligence, which contributed to his injury and prevented a
recovery.
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Where an explosion on the land of the defendant injures
persons or property on adjacent lands, does the rule of res ipsa
loquitur apply? In Bradford Co. v. Woolen Co.,
54 N. E. 528, the Supreme Court of Ohio says
from,
that it does apply in the case of an explosion
Explosion
of nitroglycerine; while in Bishop v. Brown, 61
Pac. 5o, the Court of Appeals of Colorado says that it does
not apply in the case of an explosion of a steam boiler, and
both courts cite the same authorities and profess to lay down
the same propositions of law. Evidently the line is to be
drawn somewhere between nitroglycerine and steam boilersjust where, it is hard to say. Injuries resulting from blasting
rocks are generally held to raise the presumption: Rwy. Co.
v. Eagles, 9 Colo. 544.
RAIAL PROPRTY.

The United States Circuit Court (S. D. New York), in Pine
v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 103 Federal, 337, outlines
the rights of a riparian owner to the flow of the
Natural Right
water in its natural course, not as an easement or
of
to Flow
appurtenance, but as "inseparably annexed to the
Water by
soil " as "parcel of the land itself." It states the
Riparian
Owner
rules of the Connecticut court, than which no
courts, says the judge in this case, have stated the law more
clearly. The case holds that a municipal corporation may not
justify its taking of the water from the stream on the ground
of public benefit, unless compensation has been made either
by agreement or under process of law, and where this has not
been done the riparian owner may have even as against it -an
injunction against the further use of the water, and not merely
his remedy at law for damages, since the injury being a continuing one, this latter remedy is inadequate. This is held to be the
law, "though the pecuniary damage to the riparian proprietor
is not of large amount."
SAL-S.

In StandardFurniture Co. v. Van Alstine, 62 Pacific, 145,
the Supreme Court of Washington holds entirely void a conappeared
of ditional sale of certain property where it
Puos for that the vendor knew that property was to be put
to an immoral use. The decision is complicated
which
Property Isto by the fact that the rights of third parties were
involved. Creditors of the vendee having gotten
be Used
judgment against him, took the property in queston on execu-
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tion. They were then sued by the original vendor, and it was
held he could not recover. It seems illogical to hold, as the court
does, that the conditional sale is void, and yet that vendor
cannot recover the property. If the sale is void no change can
have been made in the title and it must remain in him. A
more natural construction appears to be that in a contract of
sale with reference to an illegal object, the court will intervene
in favor of neither party, and hence in this case would not help
vendor as against the defendant, who here stood in the shoes
of the vendee.
The void character of a contract or conveyance by an insane
person is well illustrated in the case of Bates v. Hymar, 28
Ilanity of Southern, 567. The Supreme Court of MissisPurchaser sippi there holds that where an insane person has
given a note and a trust deed to secure the price of goods- he
has received, an offer to return the property was not a condition precedent to his right to avoid the deed and escape liability on the note.
TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES.

The disposition of the courts to decide whether commercial
labels, wrappers, names etc., do or do not interfere with the
Infringement prior use of others, depend on whether " the
similarity" (between the two) is such as is calculated to mislead the careless and unwary, is well illustrated by
the facts in Monopol Tobacco Works v. Gensior, 66 N. Y., supp.,
155.
But the Circuit Court of the United States (Eastern District
of Michigan) holds (American Waskboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg.
Co., 103 Fed. Rep., 281), quoting from a former
Right t
decision that: "It is the party who uses it [i. e., the
Protection trade name] first as a brand for his goods, and
builds up a business under it, who is entitled to protection, and
not the one who thought of using it on similar goods, but did
not use it. The law deals with acts, not intentions."
TRUSTS.
Apparently the addition of the word "trustee." to a grantee's
name in a deed should be enough to put the purchaser
from him on notice as to nature of the estate conBona fide
Purchaser veyed. But under the circumstances of the case
of Rua v. Watson, 83 Northwestern, 572, the
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Supreme Court of South Dakota held that, notwithstanding
this designation of the grantee, the purchaser from him for
value got a good title. No notice appeared apart from this
word in the grantee's deed; and the habendum and tenendum
of the deed, "to have and to hold unto the said party of the
second part, his heirs, successors and assigns forever," was
held in connection with the other provisions of the deed to give
a power of sale to the grantee, though called "trustee." It
further appearing that there was an oral agreement that this
grantee might sell, but should transfer the money to the
grantor, the court held that the grantee had a right to sell, and
his vendee took a clear title without any liability to the original grantor, either in reference to selling and the application of
the purchase money or otherwise. The court says: " It was
incumbent on respondent to prove that appellant had actual
or constructive notice of such restriction, and the mere employment of the word ' trustee' after the name of Walker is insufficient to create a trust or operate as notice of any kind to
appellant."
In Treadwell v. Treadwell, 57 Northeastern, ioi6, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts decides that an agreement
~to between trustee and cestui que trust is effectual to
Cagd
change trust relation into that of debtor and credRelation of
Debtor and itor ; and that the payment of interest by the origiCreditor

nal trustee to cestui que trust is inconsistent with a

trust relation, but applies to that of debtor and creditor.
WILLS.

Whether a revoking clause in a properly executed will is of
effect from the date of the execution of the will, or is merely
ambulatory and stands or falls with the will is a
Revoking
Clause In
question which has not always received the same
Destroyed
answer. It directly arose in the Supreme Court
win
of South Dakota, and the court holds, without
a discussion of the point, that the revocation is complete,
though the revoking will is not found at the death of the
testatrix. In re Belts Estate, 83 Northwestern, 564. In that
case testatrix had made two wills, each containing a clause
revoking all prior wills. At her death only the earlier will was
found. It was held, however, that, though the later will must
be presumed to have been destroyed by the testatrix animo
revocandi, nevertheless the earlier one could not stand, it having been made null and void by the revoking clause of the will
which was subsequently destroyed.
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Palmer v. Munsell, 46 Atl. 1094, is a remarkable decision.
A bequest was made "to my niece, - W." The testator had
Ltent
a niece, A. W., and two grandnieces, her daughters,
A-biguity, B. W. and C. W. In a former clause of the will
C"tuon he had left a bequest to B. W., styling her "my

niece." The Court of Chancery of New Jersey decided that this
was a case of a latent ambiguity, and that, since the testator had
called B. W. his " niece," it was to be presumed that the other
bequest referred to his other grandniece, C. W., and not to his
niece A. W. It would certainly seem that there was no latent
ambiguity in the bequest, since the real niece, A. W., answered
the description, and was the only person who did so; therefore there was no room for construction.
In Healy v. Healy, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 82, the decedent promised
the parents of the plaintiff that if they would allow the plainr.tract to
Make will

tiff to live with him, he would leave her, at his
death, a child's share of his property. The

Supreme Court of New York decided (I) that there was a
sufficient consideration for the contract to make the will, by
the release by the plaintiff's parents of her custody to the
decedent; (2) that twenty years' residence with the decedent by
the plaintiff was sufficient performance to take the case out of
the statute of frauds; and (3)that the fact that the decedent
had a child born subsequent to the contract did hot deprive
the plaintiff of her right, but operated merely to cut down
her share.

